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Abstract
The paper develops a theoretical approach to the boundaries of the multi-
national firm in the context of institutional constraints in host countries,
focusing especially on corruption. The model incorporates two types of cor-
ruption: petty bureaucratic corruption and high-level political corruption.
The model predicts that -in the absence of corruption- multinational firms
will prefer FDI (internal expansion with strong control rights) to debt (arm’s
length expansion with loose control rights), the weaker the host country’s
ability to commit. However, both types of corruption shift the trade-off
marginally toward debt. Cross-country panel empirical evidence supports
these conclusions. Corruption has a second order marginal effect and mat-
ters mostly through its interaction with political risk.
JEL Codes: F2, F3. Keywords: FDI, Debt, Multinational firms, Capital
flows, Expropriation, Corruption.
“Why, exactly, did United Fruit want to own Central American
banana plantations (and often the republics in which they were
located), while many US sellers of personal computer clones seem
reconciled simply to contract with their Korean or Taiwanese sup-
pliers? The answer is not at all obvious from the international
economics literature.” Krugman (1995), pp. 1274-75.
1 Introduction
This paper’s objective is to offer a simple theory of the multinational firm’s
boundaries in the presence of institutional constraints, focusing specifically
on the problem of corruption. Additionally, it provides some preliminary
empirical tests supporting the conclusions of the model, using data on the
cross-country composition of capital flows for the 1985-1999 period.
Whenever a firm engages in multinational expansion, it faces a funda-
mental trade-off between exploiting its potential advantages internally by
investing directly in foreign countries (FDI) vs. expansion through arm’s
length contracts. From a corporate finance perspective, FDI is not the in-
vestment itself (the plant, the assets) but a particular way to finance this
investment through equity and internal loans, that induces tighter control
rights on the subsidiary. An alternative way for the multinational firm to
take advantage of its specific assets would be to sell them directly to the host
country or to engage in a licensing agreement, in which case it would choose
to hold a claim with looser control rights on the project. I define these arm’s
length transactions as debt contracts.1
Whether the firm prefers holding equity (FDI) or debt depends on the
nature of the project and on the risks it faces.2 These must be understood
broadly as including specific industrial or climatic risks, as well as factors
resulting from the nature of the information available to the parties and the
institutional structure of the host country. Default on debt by sovereign
borrowers, expropriation of investments, and cases of corruption are well
known problems plaguing relationships between foreign investors and host
countries, particularly in less developed countries (LDCs). We should expect
1The internationally accepted definition of FDI from the IMF’s 1993 Balance of Pay-
ments Manual states: “Foreign Direct Investment is net inflows of investment to acquire a
lasting management interest (10 percent or more of voting stock) in an enterprise operating
in an economy other than that of the investor. It is the sum of equity capital, reinvestment
of earnings, and short- and long-term intercompany loans between parent firms and foreign
affiliates.” In what follows I use the term debt to design any claim with weaker control
rights than FDI.
2See Hausmann and Fernández-Arias (2000) for an interesting discussion on this.
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these features to have a significant impact on the financial decision of the
firms seeking to invest abroad.
There is a vast literature on foreign investment in the presence of politi-
cal risk. Eaton and Gersovitz (1984) first introduced the idea that intangible
assets would limit the host country’s incentives to expropriate foreign di-
rect investments. Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1994) consider the rationale
for tax holidays for foreign multinational firms in a sequential bargaining
framework, and Thomas and Worrall (1994) endogenize the size of the di-
rect investment and examine its dynamic behavior when investors are bound
to rely on self-enforcing contracts. Relatedly, Bond and Samuelson (1989)
propose a two-period model in which the level of commitment of the host
country is endogenized, and the firm can respond by altering the capital in-
tensity of its investment. These contributions share the characteristic that
they study the amount, input structure and timing of FDI when faced with
institutional constraints, but do not consider alternative ways of transferring
capital.
Albuquerque (2003) extends Thomas and Worrall’s framework to allow
precisely for different types of investment (FDI or portfolio flows) and the
possibility of exogenous termination of contracts. Assuming the inalienability
of part or all of FDI investments, coupled with the imperfect enforcement
of international financing contracts, his model reaches two main conclusions.
First, financially constrained countries, which empirically can also be seen as
the ones characterized by higher political risk, receive a higher share of FDI.
Second, FDI commands a lower default premium and is thus less volatile
than other type of flows. Similarly, Schnitzer (2002) examines the trade-off
between FDI and debt in the presence of sovereign risk and finds that FDI is
more likely to prevail when it allows for a better exogenous external option,
the project is risky and the foreign investor has a greater efficiency advantage
in running the project.3
Recognizing the pivotal role of the risk of expropriation, the present paper
starts from a simple model yielding a conclusion similar to Albuquerque
(2003), namely that FDI is more likely in the context of higher political
risk. The common building block is the inalienability of part of the direct
investment, or equivalently the existence of an outside option for this type
of investment in case of expropriation. The paper then goes on to model
explicitly the impact of corruption on foreign investment. In doing so, it fills
a gap since the existing theoretical literature has not yet explicitly modeled
corruption as part of the ownership decision in international investment,
3Related contributions include Janeba (2002), Goldstein and Razin (2002), Fosfuri
(2000), Kraay, Loayza, Serven and Ventura (2004) and Tirole (2003), among others.
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despite mounting empirical evidence that corruption is one of the factors
seriously affecting the conditions facing foreign investors.
The model’s basic building block draws on Williamson (1975), Hart and
Moore (1990) and Hart (1995): By undertaking a specific action (here a sunk
investment to retain some “secret” on the technology) the firm chooses ex
ante the financial structure of its investment, which has an influence on its
bargaining position in subsequent periods. The incompleteness of contracts,
arising from the possibility that the host country may renege on its com-
mitment, implies that the returns from the relationship depend precisely on
this ex post bargaining position, so the ownership structure’s decision is not
neutral.
Corruption in the context of capital flows and foreign investment is a
multifaceted phenomenon.4 I argue that it can usefully be categorized in two
main types, namely bureaucratic petty corruption, akin to outright extortion,
and high-level political corruption. To allow political corruption to arise
endogenously, I assume that the value of the flow of externalities is known
to the investing firm, but not to the host country. I model the bargaining
game between the firm and the government by extending under asymmetric
information a simple game form implementing the Nash bargaining solution,
originally proposed in a complete information setting by Howard (1992) and
Osborne and Rubinstein (1994). In this game-theoretic setting, I assume that
an expert is in charge of reducing the asymmetry of information on behalf of
the government, in the spirit of the principal-agent model of corruption (see
Laffont and Tirole, 1991).
In a nutshell, the conclusions of the model point to the following find-
ings. Petty bureaucratic corruption acts as a tax and may shift the choice
of foreign investors toward debt. Political corruption, on the other hand,
affects investment through its interaction with the risk of expropriation, ac-
tually reducing the effect of the latter. This is because corruption induces
the expert to make more effort to learn the firm’s type and extract its rent,
thereby reducing the informational advantage of firms choosing FDI in case
of expropriation. Empirical tests support the view that corruption matters
mostly through this second order countervailing effect on the risk of expropri-
ation. Political risk remains the foremost institutional driver behind foreign
investors’ financing structure choice, but, intuitively, corruption conditions
its intensity. One conjecture is that previous empirical contributions that
supported a separate role for corruption failed to control for political risk,
thereby attributing part of its effects to the corruption variable.
Section 2 documents and discusses the two different types of corrupt
4I thank two anonymous referees and the editor for stressing this aspect.
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constraints on foreign investment. Section 3 presents the model, setting up
the basic trade-off between FDI and debt with credit constraint and lack of
commitment, and introducing asymmetric information and the two types of
corruption in this framework. Section 4 then presents the empirical evidence
and Section 5 concludes.
2 Corruption and Foreign Investment
Bureaucratic Corruption
I distinguish between two types of corruption. Bureaucratic corruption
refers to corrupt demands faced by firms once settled in the foreign country.
These demands, in the form of excessive administrative requirements, red
tape and systematic bribe extraction by low-level government officials, are
the manifestations of corruption most commonly mentioned in the literature.5
Morisset and Lumenga Neso (2002) document extensively the administrative
barriers faced by foreign investors in a sample of 32 developing countries,
listing them in 3 categories: Entry approvals; land, site development and
utility; and operational requirements. They show that such requirements
are pervasive and that higher costs and delays are strongly correlated with
the prevailing level of corruption, as measured by the Transparency Interna-
tional index. Rose-Ackerman (1999) also offers numerous examples of such
corruption.
I model the multinational firm dealing with a potentially corrupt local
bureaucracy by assuming that government officials in charge of allocating a
license-type good may ask for a bribe and that foreign firms are at a disad-
vantage compared to local firms, because of their lack of personal connections
and knowledge of the local customs. Furthermore, in this case of petty cor-
ruption, bureaucrats are likely to have only limited information on the firm’s
profit, so I assume that they chose the amount of the bribe by maximizing
their return in a context in which they risk being detected and punished.
Political Corruption
Political corruption emanates from the interaction between the multina-
tional firm and a host-country government official in charge of assessing the
value of the investment and of negotiating the incentive package to be granted
to the incoming investors. In this case, the firm and local counterparts are
equally involved in the dishonest deals.
There are also plenty of illustrations of this type of behavior. While an
adviser to a Latin American government a few years ago, I observed that
5See for example Wei (2000), Wei and Wu (2001) and Smarzynska and Wei (2000)
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representatives of foreign firms looking for investment opportunities in the
country would almost invariably be attended by high-ranking officials. It
appeared that such practices often led to some rent extraction, for example
in the form of future joint ventures with officials’ front-men or by securing
employment for relatives in the newly established firms.6
Firms find an interest in entering such deals if they perceive that the
resulting connections may eventually help them secure specific markets or in-
vestment opportunities, for example in procurement or privatization processes.7
Press articles regularly report stories of firms buying their way into foreign
oil, gas or telecommunication markets.8
The main difference between petty bureaucratic and high-level political
corruption is that the former takes the form of outright extortion and imposes
a pure loss on the firm, while the latter generates the opportunity of a gain
for both the government and the firm.
I model the second approach by assuming that a local politician is in
charge of evaluating the value of the project.9 Conceptually, the politician is
an intermediate agent between the principal and the firm, whose contractual
role is to reduce the asymmetry of information on behalf of the principal. One
possibility is a government political appointee trying to maximize welfare
(note that non fully benevolent objective function can be accommodated
under this approach). Alternatively, the principal can be thought of as the
public, represented by the idea embodied in the constitution or in the grand
contract with the government in charge, in which case the politician can even
be the ruler himself as in some of the examples above (see Laffont and Tirole,
1993).
6See Hines (1995) for empirical evidence that “payroll” type corruption is indeed im-
portant.
7See Rose-Ackerman (1999) for examples of firms bribing high-level officials from
Greece, Argentina, Peru, Zaire, Ivory Coast, Thailand and Slovakia. Hines (1995) shows
that nearly half of 2,219 US business executives surveyed find no ethical impediment in
paying bribes to further their company’s objectives. Further discussion can be found
in Kaufmann (2004) and Transparency International’s press releases, such as the Bribe
Payers Index at http://www.transparency.org.
8Recent examples include the involvement of a French oil company (formerly Elf, now
merged with Total) in cash payments to high government officials (including presidents) in
Nigeria and Gabon; commissions paid by a consortium including French Technip, Italian
Snamprogetti and US KBR, filial of Halliburton, to secure contracts in Nigeria; bribes
paid by the French electronic group Thales in Argentina in the 1990s; and accusations
of corruption against the French firm Alcatel, the Spanish electric equipment provider
Inabensa and Swedish Ericsson, to secure telecommunication contracts in Costa Rica (The
Economist, 13/11/03; Le Monde, 16/10/04 and 05/11/04).
9Note that local firms can similarly be engaging in collusion over state subsidies, without
affecting the results of the model.
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The politician enjoys decentralized power in the form of information not
directly verifiable by the principal and can then take advantage of her position
to make a side contract with the investor, sharing the potential information
rent in exchange for a favorable report. This is modelled in a hard informa-
tion setting à la Tirole (1992), in which the politician generates a verifiable
signal on the project with some positive probability and ensuring her honest
behavior requires costly incentive payments. I extend this setting to model
the politician’s choice of the supervision intensity as an effort variable.
3 The Model
Consider the following three period model. In country L, local firms produce
a good with a constant return to scale technology of marginal cost cL. This
good is consumed by local consumers who have a downward sloping demand
function. As a result of investment in R&D and long term experience in
managerial best practice, a foreign firm F has developed an alternative tech-
nology, which allows it to produce the same good at a lower marginal cost
cF , and now wants to enter country L’s market.
Formally, and with the subscript t = 0 ,1 ,2 referring to time, we have:
- t = 0, the benchmark situation in country L, with only
indigenous producers of cost cL.
- t = 1, the situation in L when the improved technology (cF )
is first introduced and competes with high cost producers (cL).
- t = 2, the situation in L when the improved technology (cF )
competes with local producers who have benefited from techno-
logical spillovers (cost cLS < cL).10
In each period, aggregate welfare is given byWt = SCt +ΠLt +ΠFt , whereΠLt
(resp. ΠFt ) is the profit of firms using the “local” (resp. “foreign”) technology,
and SCt denotes consumer surplus. Assuming there is no discounting, the net
benefit of the introduction of the technology is thus given by11:
G = (W1 −W0) + (W2 −W0) ≡ G1 +G2. (1)
10See Blomström and Kokko (1996) for a discussion of spillovers arising from the oper-
ations of multinational corporations abroad.
11G can be disentangled into a competition and a technological effect. For simple down-
ward sloping demand functions, it is easily shown that G, the sum of both effects, is always
positive. We simply use the fact that higher spillovers imply a higher global value of the
project.
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The parties are risk neutral and the total surplus is divided among them
according to a Nash bargaining process. In a world of complete contracting,
the firm would simply sell the blueprint of the technology to country L, based
on its total value. From now on, I call this the “Debt” option, in the sense
that the country (or some local firm) simply contracts debt to buy the tech-
nology and the necessary inputs to make it work (machines, management),
possibly collateralized by its expected gain from this acquisition, and sets up
a locally owned firm endowed with the new production process.
Alternatively, the firm may choose to engage in FDI. In this case, it will
have to pay in period 1 a sunk cost K. This is the cost of adapting to different
business conditions, finding local partners and counterparts, dealing with
local bureaucrats, etc. It is greater than it would be for the host country (or
some local investor) who has better knowledge of local conditions and better
access to the local administration. On the other hand, the firm keeps the
property rights to the technology.12
I assume that country L is likely to be credit constrained. In this case, a
possible alternative is for the firm to sell its technology against the promise
of partial payments in each period, according to the realization of benefits.
Then, the surplus from a debt contract is shared in each successive period,
so that global payoffs are as follows:
ULDEBT = U
F
DEBT =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
G2, (2)
while in the case of FDI, they are
ULFDI = U
F
FDI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
G2. (3)
Hence, in a world with perfect information and no commitment problems,
debt is always more efficient. However, if the risk of contract repudiation
exists, country L may renege on its commitment at the beginning of the
second period and force a renegotiation.13 Considering for example that
12For simplicity, I assume that the efficiency of the new firm in the host country and the
resulting spillovers for the local industry are the same regardless of the way the technology
is introduced. On the one hand, a subsidiary may benefit from specific spillovers from the
parent company, that would not accrue to a locally owned firm. On the other hand, local
entrepreneurs may benefit from better knowledge and information about the business
conditions in their country (see Schnitzer, 2002).
13As stated in Eaton and Gersovitz (1984), to have expropriation actually occurring,
there must be some randomness, which is resolved between the time of investment and
the expropriation decision. Otherwise, in a deterministic setting, investors simply refrain
from doing investment that they anticipate will be expropriated, so the effect is on the
size of investments but expropriation never occurs.
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each period of the model lasts for several years, the assumption of imperfect
long term commitment arises naturally from possible changes at the head of
government or other shifts in the environment.
I assume that expropriation arises with positive probability γ, followed
by a renegotiation at t = 2 in which the status quo levels depend on the
ownership structure.14 In the case of debt, the firm has a status quo utility
level of zero, so the country appropriates the whole surplus. In the case
of FDI, the investor faces the risk of outright expropriation (e.g. through
the nationalization of the productive assets), but it is also exposed to a
more subtle form of expropriation, in which the host country manages to
capture the rents generated by the subsidiary through specific actions like
modifications of the tax schedule or tariff duties.15 In this case, the firm
keeps the property rights over the subsidiary and can recover part of its
second period profits, for example shifting some of its subsequent production
back to another international location or through accounting gimmicks.16 I
simply assume that the firm retains θΠF2 , where θ < 1.
The outcome of the bargaining process becomes the following. In case of
debt, the first period surplus G1 is divided evenly, while in the second period
in case of renegotiation the firm receives nothing with probability γ, hence:
ULDEBT =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1 + γ)G2, (4)
UFDEBT =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1− γ)G2.
In case of FDI, at the beginning of period 2 the status quo payoffs of the
firm and the host country are θΠF2 and G2− θΠF2 respectively. The outcome
in this case is:
14I keep γ exogenous to maintain the model tractable when introducing corruption. One
way to endogenize it would be to allow the firm to chose the quality of the technology
it transfers (see Fosfuri, 2000, and Bond and Samuelson, 1989). Alternatively, one could
assume that expropriation occurs only when G2 − θΠF2 > 12G2, as signaled by a referee.
The results of the paper would be qualitatively unaltered. Note that in practice, political
expropriations occur for reasons that are at least partly orthogonal to strict economic
considerations, justifying the exogeneity of γ.
15See Tirole (2003) for an analysis of the common agency issues involved, as policy
decisions depend on the FDI-debt choices of many firms.
16See Schnitzer (2002) for a more detailed discussion and a model where both cases of
expropriation and an exogenous outside option for FDI are considered. Janeba (2002)
endogenizes this outside option by considering that firms may invest simultaneously in
two countries and use the threat to shift production from one to the other as a disciplining
device for governments.
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ULFDI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
(1 + γ)G2 − γθΠF2 , (5)
UFFDI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
(1− γ)G2 + γθΠF2 .
The trade-off faced by the firm between the debt and the FDI option is
given by:
FDI Â Debt⇔ γθΠF2 −
K
2
> 0. (6)
Equation (6) shows that debt is not always preferred by the firm and
provides a first prediction, namely that a higher risk of repudiation makes
FDI more likely.17 Moreover, the trade-off is more favorable to FDI, the
greater the share θ of second period profits that can be recovered in case of
contract repudiation, the greater ΠF2 , which is the case when the spillovers are
of small magnitude, and the lower the sunk costK. This simple setting is thus
consistent with the literature on political risk discussed in the introduction,
as well as basic empirical evidence on technological transfers.18
In the next section, I analyze how this basic trade-off is affected by the
possibility of corruption.
3.1 Corruption
In a situation where the foreign firm has developed some specific technology
or know-how, it is natural to assume that it has private information con-
cerning its exact characteristics. I model this by assuming an asymmetry of
information on the level of spillovers, which are known to the firm but not
to the host country.
Assume that the net benefit can take two values GS and GW , such that
GS > GW , with the notation ∆G = ∆G2 = GS − GW . The subscript S
17Note that more sophisticated mechanisms could be envisioned, for example frontload-
ing the firm’s share in period 1 in case of debt to push it to choose this type of involvement
more often. This would amount to endogenizing the parties’ bargaining weights. Again, I
do not pursue this line to concentrate on the issue of corruption.
18Markusen (1995) reports that most empirical studies support the view that the inter-
nalization of technological transfers (i.e. FDI) is more likely for R&D intensive firms with
new and technically complex products. If we take the view that this type of production is
characterized by relatively low potential spillovers, because the complexity of its products
implies a less intensive linkage with domestic suppliers (which seems to be one key factor
for the transmission of externalities, see Blomström and Kokko (1996)), this evidence fits
well within our framework.
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(resp. W ) stands for strong (resp. weak) second period spillovers and can be
said to correspond to the “good type” (resp. “bad type”) project. The host
country has previous beliefs about the realization of G given by:
Pr(G = GS) = ν,
Pr(G = GW ) = 1− ν.
The Nash Solution with Asymmetric Information
To solve the asymmetric information case, I introduce the following com-
plete information extensive game form, which exactly implements the Nash
solution. It is a simplified version of Howard (1992), proposed by Osborne
and Rubinstein (1994).
The game is a simple three-stage alternated offers bargaining. The first
mover (the country) offers a possible agreement Y = (y1, G−y1). The second
mover (the firm) responds to this offer by a counteroffer X = (x1, G − x1)
and a threat to terminate the negotiation. Ex ante, the multinational firm’s
position runs as follows: “Given your offer, I will quit with probability 1− p
(thus an ex ante threat). Furthermore, if negotiation continues and you don’t
accept my counterofferX and insist in implementing Y , there is a probability
1− p that I will decline any agreement.”
The mechanism which leads the players to choose the Nash solution is
intuitive: any initial offer which fails to propose this solution can be met
with a “punishment” that leaves the initial player worse off than when he
proposes an equal splitting of the pie. This is because if y1 > G2 , the firm has
the possibility to choose a probability p < 1, so that the negotiation ends
with a strictly positive probability. Faced with this threat, it is the country’s
best strategy to offer the Nash solution and the firm agrees to this choice
by choosing X = Y and p = 1. Of course, the country would never choose
y1 <
G
2
, since the firm would again choose X = Y and p = 1. Appendix 1
presents a complete resolution of the game under complete and incomplete
information.
There are several reasons why bargaining can be considered a reasonable
modeling option for foreign investment.19 In a context in which countries
strongly compete to attract investors, the discussions between firms and gov-
ernments can indeed be considered as a bargaining game over a whole array
of items that determine the distribution of potential benefits (see Moran,
1998). Firms negotiate tax holidays, subsidies and other supporting mea-
sures like the financing of infrastructure relevant to the future plants, e.g.
19The bargaining approach has been adopted for example by Bond and Samuelson (1989)
and Doyle and Van Wijnbergen (1994).
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roads, electricity or phone lines, while governments routinely use different
mechanisms to try to capture more of the benefits, for example imposing
domestic-content, export-performance, joint venture, and technology licens-
ing requirements.
The relevance of bargaining can be linked to the necessary incomplete-
ness of contracts involving sovereign parties (see Eaton and Fernandez, 1995,
on sovereign debt). Although the analysis of self-enforcing contracts is im-
portant from a positive point of view and has provided fundamental im-
provements in our understanding of capital flows, the actual occurrence of
expropriations and renegotiations gives the indication that, for some reasons,
parties find it hard to rely on such contracts.
To see the implication of the asymmetry of information for the bargaining
problem, consider again the extensive game form introduced above. When
one of the players has private information about his type, it obviously matters
whether the informed party moves first or not. To avoid the multiplicity of
equilibria inherent to a signaling game, and to keep the model as tractable
as possible, I stick to the case where the uninformed party (the host country)
moves first. The timing of the bargaining procedure is the same as under
symmetric information, with the only difference that now, when choosing y1
at the beginning of the game, country L does not know the true value of G.
Again, what happens is intuitively clear. If the country chooses y1 = GW2 ,
the complete information solution (thus the Nash solution) is implemented
with probability 1−ν (whenG = GW ), but with probability ν (whenG = GS)
it incurs a loss since its initial offer is less than GS
2
.
On the other hand, if the country’s initial offer is y1 = GS2 , the complete
information solution is now implemented with probability ν (when G = GS),
but with probability 1 − ν (when G = GW ) the offer is too high and the
firm replies with p = GW
GS
and x1 = GW2 , so that the country suffers a loss
with respect to the Nash solution. Note that in this case both parties are
worse off than under complete information, a global loss of efficiency typical
of bargaining under asymmetric information.
Furthermore, it is shown in Appendix 1 that an intermediate value of y1
is never optimal, so that depending on the value of the parameters, the best
choice of y1 is given by either y1 = GW2 or y1 =
GS
2
. Table 1 summarizes the
outcome of the game for different values of the parameters.
Table 1: outcome of the bargaining game with asymmetric information.
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ν ≤ GW
GS+GW
ν > GW
GS+GW
Host country: y1 = GW2 Host country: y1 =
GS
2
MNE (GS)* (GS2 −
∆G
2
, GS
2
+ ∆G
2
) (GS
2
, GS
2
)
MNE (GW )** (GW2 ,
GW
2
) (
G2W
2GS
,
G2W
2GS
)
* x1 = y1, p = 1 (both when y1 = GW2 and y1 =
GS
2
).
** x1 = y1, p = 1 (if y1 = GW2 ); x1 =
GW
2
, p = GW
GS
(if y1 = GW2 ).
I now consider how the different types of corruption introduced above will
affect the FDI-debt trade-off.20
3.2 Investment under Bureaucratic Corruption
Consider a situation in which local bureaucrats are in charge of attributing
licenses to firms, for example authorizing imports of specific inputs or de-
livering health and safety certificates. As discussed above, these low-level
officials are unlikely to be have detailed information on the firms they deal
with, so I simply assume that in period 2, they require from the firm that
has chosen FDI a fixed bribe B in order to issue the relevant license.21
Assume that bureaucrats risk being detected and punished with proba-
bility τ(B), with τ 0 > 0 and τ 00 ≥ 0. One explanation is that the firms’
willingness to denounce corrupt demands is an increasing function of their
amount. Alternatively, huge bribes are simply more difficult to hide, because
they involve observable transfers of wealth or they result in public employees
enjoying acquisitive power beyond what their salaries would permit. These
cases are thus more likely to draw media attention and be brought to light.
Accordingly, bureaucrats choose B by maximizing a return function of
the type:
20Ex ante, investors have superior information on the quality of their project, irrespec-
tive of the type of ownership chosen. Alternatively, a corporate finance perspective is
likely to put emphasis on the fact that debtors would enjoy superior information on some
aspects of a debt contract. However, the contradiction is only apparent. As will become
clear below, FDI does generate an additional informational edge for investors in case of
renegotiation. Thus, in relative terms, debtors do know more about the claim (they are
a lesser informational disadvantage) in case of debt. Other types of asymmetries could
be envisioned, for example about local demand conditions, in which case the government
could be the one having private information. In this case, a similar relative effect would
hold and debtors would indeed enjoy the stronger informational advantage in the case of
debt.
21This does not mean that local firms are not themselves subject to bribes, but that
foreign firms are better targets for corrupt officials, because of their relative ignorance of
the local rules and their lack of personal connections for example.
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max
B
(1− τ(B))B.
In a context more prone to corruption, i.e. one in which the probability
of detection is lower for a given B, the above maximization problem leads
bureaucrats to demand higher bribes.
In order to see how bureaucratic corruption affects the trade-off between
FDI and debt, first consider the complete information case. Clearly, the
prospect of giving away an amount B does not modify the status quo of
the firm when faced with an attempt of expropriation, which in any case is
given by θΠF2 . However, note that when B >
1
2
(1 − γ)G2 + γθΠF2 − θΠF2 =
(1 − γ)
£
1
2
G2 − θΠF2
¤
, the bribe exceeds the firms profits minus its outside
option, so it will choose to leave the country.22
The firm’s payoffs to engage in FDI and debt respectively are then given
by:
UFFDI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
(1− γ)G2 + γθΠF2 −B if B ≤ (1− γ)
∙
1
2
G2 − θΠF2
¸
,
=
1
2
(G1 −K) + θΠF2 otherwise.
UFDEBT =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1− γ)G2.
The trade-off then becomes:
FDI Â Debt ⇔ γθΠF2 −
K
2
−B > 0 if B ≤ (1− γ)
∙
1
2
G2 − θΠF2
¸
,
⇔ γθΠF2 −
K
2
− 1
2
(1− γ)G2 > 0 otherwise.
Under asymmetric information, the results are similar. Consider first the
case ν ≤ GW
GS+GW
. With FDI, The firm’s second period surplus is given by
1
2
(1−γ)(G2,S +∆G2)+ γθΠF2,W for a good type firm, and by 12(1− γ)G2,W +
γθΠF2,W for a bad type one.
22While the empirical literature mostly focuses on how corruption may keep investors
away from specific countries, stories of foreign investors forced to leave by excessive cor-
ruption make regular headlines in developing countries. This will be the case if myopic
bureaucrats place demands such that they extinguish the source of the bribe. If firms an-
ticipate the level of B as in the present framework, this would never happen, as they would
just refrain from choosing FDI. However, one can envision unexpected ex post shocks lead-
ing to an increase in corruption, so that firms that have chosen FDI are pushed toward
the exit.
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Defining B ≡ 1
2
(1− γ)G2,W + γθΠF2,W − θΠF2,W , and B ≡ 12(1− γ)(G2,S +
∆G2) + γθΠF2,W − θΠF2,S, as the thresholds below which bureaucrats are able
to extract bribes from both types of firms and from the good type one only
respectively, the FDI-debt trade-off in the three possible cases is given by23:
FDI Â Debt⇔
• γθΠF2,W − K2 −B > 0, if B ≤ B,
• νγθΠF2,W − (1− ν)
h
(1−γ)G2,W
2
− θΠF2,W
i
− K
2
− νB > 0, if B ≤ B ≤ B,
• νθΠF2,S+(1− ν) θΠF2,W− (1−γ)2 [ν (G2,S +∆G2) + (1− ν)G2,W ]−K2 > 0,
if B > B.
Interestingly, corruption favors a shift toward debt but, as the prone-
ness to corruption increases, the marginal effect is decreasing and eventually
vanishes.24
I summarize the results of this section in the following proposition.
Proposition 1 Petty bureaucratic corruption, in which low-level public of-
ficials uninformed about firms’ true profitability place fixed bribe demands,
shifts the trade-off of incoming investors toward debt. Moreover, the mar-
ginal effect of this type of bribery is smaller for larger bribe demands, and
there is a bribe threshold above which it becomes nil.
The simple intuition driving this result is that bureaucratic corruption
acts as a tax on FDI, thus making debt more desirable. However, if expected
corruption exceeds some threshold, debt always dominates and corruption
has no marginal effect on the ownership decision of foreign investors.
3.3 Investment under Political Corruption
As discussed in section 2, consider a politician under a (possibly implicit)
contract with a principal (the people themselves or the highest tier of gov-
ernment) maximizing some welfare objective function. The position of the
politician gives her access to information on the true type of the firm not
23If B ≤ B ≤ B the bribe exceeds the bad type firm’s profits minus its outside option
and is only paid by the good type. If B ≤ B bureaucrats completely extinguish the
potential source of bribe. If bureaucrats anticipate that there is an upper bound on firms’
willingness to pay bribes, the third case would disappear.
24When ν > GWGS+GW , the expressions for the trade-off are slightly modified but the
conclusions are strictly similar, so we do not present the results to save space.
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directly verifiable by this principal, allowing here to extract the asymmetric
information rent of the firm.
Formally, consider a supervision technology à la Tirole (1992), where
the politician receives with some positive probability ξ a verifiable signal σ
on the good type investor (see Figure A1 in Appendix 2). Collusion only
occurs when ν ≤ GW
GS+GW
, which is the only case where the investor enjoys an
information rent, so I shall concentrate on this case.25 When the politician
detects a good type project (GS), she may collude with the firm to report the
project as being of the bad type (GW ), and share the potential bargaining
surplus 1
2
∆G. If collusion occurs, I assume that the politician has all the
bargaining power and receives the whole surplus.26 Moreover, when the firm
transfers an amount t, the politician receives only kt, where the deadweight
loss parameterized by k ≤ 1 corresponds to the transaction cost of collusion.27
Thus, to prevent collusion, the politician needs to be given an incentive
payment s = k 1
2
∆G when she reveals a good type project.
Consider furthermore that in order to have a signal with probability ξ,
the politician must exert an effort, which has a disutility Ψ(ξ) (Ψ0(ξ) >
0,Ψ(ξ)00 > 0), because, say, it is time consuming and her opportunity cost is
high. The politician is rewarded with a payment r for each dollar that her
report allows to recover. She will thus choose a level of effort so as to solve:
max
ξ
ξr
∆G
2
−Ψ(ξ). (7)
Taking a simple functional form Ψ(ξ) = ∆G
2
ξ2
2
for the purpose of normaliza-
tion, it comes immediately that ξ∗ = r.
Anticipating this, the optimal contract with the politician will set the
reward r so as to maximize:
max
r
ξ
∆G
2
− ξr∆G
2
= r
∆G
2
− r2∆G
2
, (8)
where the first term is the gain due to the report occurring with probability
ξ, and the second term is the cost of the incentive payment to the politician.
Thus, r∗ = 1
2
, and an informative report is received with probability ξ∗ = 1
2
.
25When ν > GWGS+GW , asymmetric information and the politician intervention have no
effect on the trade-off between FDI and debt (see Appendix 2).
26Considering that the politician and the firm get shares of the surplus equal to α and
1− α respectively, would not change the following results.
27k can be considered to capture both material difficulties in realizing illegal side pay-
ments and psychological traits of the corrupt agents, like their relative honesty or their
fear to be caught. See Laffont and Tirole (1991) for a discussion.
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Consider now the case where the politician is potentially corrupt. We
have seen that she receives s = k 1
2
∆G if the side contract with the firm is
enforced. The maximization program of the politician becomes therefore:
max
ξ
ξ
∙
max(k, r)
∆G
2
¸
−Ψ(ξ), (9)
where the side contract prevails if k > r and a truthful report is made
otherwise. The politician will thus choose ξ∗ = max(k, r). Considering this,
the optimal r is r∗ = 1
2
as long as k < 1
2
and r∗ = k otherwise. As a result,
ξ∗ = 1
2
when k < 1
2
and ξ∗ = k otherwise.
As k increases, i.e. as the environment becomes more prone to corruption
because of lower transaction costs, the intensity of monitoring ξ∗ will thus
also increase.
The timing of the events is given in Figure 1.
The firm
declares its
intention to
invest.
N egotiation
under
sym m etric
information
The politician
chooses its
monitoring intensity ξ
according to  the 
rew ard scheme she 
faces.
ξ
1-ξ
N egotiation
under
asym m etric
information
A  politician is
put in charge of
assessing the
potential value of
the project.
The incentive 
payment is made 
to avoid collusion. 
The politician
reveals her signal
(proba ξ)
Figure 1: Timing
In this simple informational structure, the collusion proofness principle
holds, so it is always profitable to pay the politician in exchange for a hard
signal that the project is good.28 We can now look at the consequences for
the trade-off between debt and FDI. Three cases will occur:
- Case 1: with probability νξ , the project is good, the politician has a
signal GS, reveals it, and the full information solution is implemented.
- Case 2: with probability ν(1 − ξ) , the project is good, the politician
has no signal, and the asymmetric information solution prevails.
- Case 3: with probability 1 − ν , the project is bad, the politician has
no signal, and the asymmetric information solution prevails. Note however
28See for example Tirole (1992). Heterogeneity of politicians would be needed to have
corruption at equilibrium.
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that this case is similar to the complete information one, since the country
offers GW
2
and the firm has no rent anyway.
With two types of project and complete information, the trade-off be-
tween FDI and debt is given by:
FDI Â Debt⇔ γ ¡νθΠF2,S + (1− ν)θΠF2,W¢− K2 > 0, (10)
where ΠF2,S (resp. ΠF2,W ) corresponds to the second period profit of the in-
coming firm if the spillover is strong (resp. weak). Under asymmetric infor-
mation, the trade-off becomes (see Appendix 2):
FDI Â Debt⇔ γθΠF2,W − γξνθ
¡
ΠF2,W −ΠF2,S
¢
− K
2
> 0. (11)
Now, when renegotiation happens, with probability 1 − νξ (the sum of
the probabilities of cases 2 and 3 above) the host country is uninformed
about the firm’s type. In particular, with probability ν(1− ξ) (case 2), the
good type is able to mimic the bad one and receives an extra gain from
negotiating under asymmetric information, thanks to a better status quo
position (θΠF2,W instead of θΠF2,S).29 Note that it is the interaction of the
risk of repudiation (which induces renegotiation with a certain probability)
and of asymmetric information and potential corruption (which modifies the
firm’s bargaining position in this renegotiation) that together shift the trade-
off. Since ΠF2,W is greater than ΠF2,S, it appears that an increase in the
probability ξ that the politician has a signal on the good project, shifts the
trade-off marginally toward debt. When the politician chooses the intensity
of monitoring according to her potential reward, ξ is higher in a more corrupt
environment. The conclusion is therefore that environments more prone to
corruption tend to favor debt relative to FDI.
I summarize the insights from this section in the following proposition:
Proposition 2 An environment more prone to political corruption (lower
transaction costs of corruption, thus higher k) shifts the choice of investment
toward debt. Moreover, the effect of this type of corruption is effective through
its interaction with the commitment variable γ.
Corollary 3 An increase in corruption (higher k) has the effect of dimin-
ishing the marginal impact of political risk.
29ΠF2,W corresponds to the second period profit of the incoming firm if the spillover is
weak, i.e. if the firm retains a greater competitive edge, and is therefore greater than ΠF2,S .
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The intuition is as follows. Asymmetric information gives firms choosing
FDI an edge in case of expropriation because they can then pretend to have
a higher outside option. In a more corrupt environment, this edge becomes
less important because officials exert a higher monitoring effort to capture
part of the firms’ rent as bribe, so their true type is revealed more often.
This shifts investors’ preferences marginally toward debt, counteracting the
effect of political risk.
Technically, under asymmetric information, a good type firm choosing the
FDI option is able to mimic a bad type in case of renegotiation and obtain a
better payoff. The more corrupt the environment, the higher the politician’s
monitoring effort and the incentive payments, so complete information pre-
vails more often, thus reducing the interest for the good firm to choose FDI,
and shifting the trade-off marginally toward debt.
The next section presents some illustrative empirical evidence.
4 Empirical Evidence
4.1 The Data
Foreign Direct Investment as a share of total private capital flows.
The relative prevalence of FDI in a country’s capital flows is measured as
the amount of foreign direct investment as a share of total private capital
flows, consisting of private debt (commercial bank lending, bonds, and other
private credits) and non-debt flows (FDI and portfolio equity investment),
using gross inflows data from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics
Database.30 I use average log values for three successive periods: 1985-1989,
1990-1994, and 1995-1999, getting cross-country samples of 68, 84, and 92
observations respectively, and an unbalanced panel covering three periods
and 106 countries (See list in Appendix 3).
Risk of contract repudiation and corruption. To capture country-
level political risk in the sense of lack of commitment, I employ an indicator
of the risk of government repudiation of contracts, published in the Inter-
national Country Risk Guide by the private firm Political Risk Service, Inc.
I also use the corruption index from the same source. This is a measure
of “corruption within the political system, which distorts the economic and
30The test proposed here, using aggregated capital flows data, must obviously be seen
as preliminary. In particular, it might be argued that not all private capital flows have
to do with multinational firms’ operations (see a robustness check on this below), and
conversely that not all private borrowing is recorded as private capital flows, for example
when it is secured by a domestic intermediary or a multilateral agency.
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financial environment”. Alternatively, to account for the concern that it
may rather be capturing political corruption, I use an index of bureaucratic
quality, from the same source, as a proxy for bureaucratic corruption.
These indices are available for the years 1985, 1990 and 1995 for all the
countries in our sample and, for the sake of interpretation, are rescaled from
0 (less risk, least corrupt) to 10 (more risk, most corrupt). I use beginning
of the period values to mitigate potential endogeneity problems.
Other data.31 The following control variables are included (again, be-
ginning of the period values are used when applicable): income measured by
GDP per capita, the openness of the economy proxied by the ratio of imports
to GDP, the size of the economy measured by total GDP, all three (in logs)
from the World Bank World Development Indicators; an index of inflation
to proxy for macroeconomic stability (a higher value meaning less inflation),
from the Inter-American Development Bank; and a set of time-invariant char-
acteristics, including a measure of the value of the subsoil natural wealth of
a country and latitude, from the World Bank.
4.2 Empirical Results
Following the model, I test a specification of the form:
FDI / total priv. K = α+ β1 risk+ β2 corruption
+β3 risk*corruption+ β4 control var.+ u,(12)
where β2 captures what I called the bureaucratic corruption effect, while β3
correspond to the political corruption dimension.
Table 2 shows the basic panel estimations, using the ratio of FDI to
total private capital flows as dependent variable. The results support the
main conclusions above. The previous literature indicates that time-invariant
variables (soil and latitude) are important determinants of the composition of
capital flows, but the use of these variables rules out fixed-effect estimation.
On the other hand, random effect estimation is not the most suitable option
for cross-country data. Consequently, equations 1 to 3 are estimated without
intercept, while time-invariant variables and regional dummies account for
some of the country effects. In columns 4 and 5, fixed effects estimation
are performed as a robustness check, excluding time-invariant characteristics
and country dummies. In all cases, traditional controls (income, openness,
size) are introduced, as well as time dummies, which are meant to capture
some key structural evolutions that affected flows of capital during the period
31Part of this data set was kindly provided by the Inter-American Development Bank
Research Department.
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under scrutiny, such as the end of the cold war, the launch of the EU single
market and the change of attitude towards FDI in developing countries.
(Table 2 here)
The risk of contract repudiation and its interaction with corruption give
results consistent with the political corruption story of the model, both vari-
ables being of the expected sign and economically significant in all five spec-
ifications. For each point increase in the risk index (on a scale from 0 to 10),
corresponding to a higher risk of contract repudiation, the share of FDI in
total private capital flows increases by between 3 and 4%, while maintaining
that risk index constant, a one point variation in the corruption index has
an opposite effect of between 0.5 and 0.8%.32
As for the direct effect of corruption, it is as expected in columns 1 and
2, where we get a negative and significant coefficient, indicating a marginal
effect of around 1.5% for each additional point on the corruption scale of
the PRS index. This confirms the idea that corruption has both an indirect
effect through its interaction with political risk and a direct one, linked to
bureaucratic corruption. Moreover, in column 2, I test the possibility of a
decreasing direct marginal effect of corruption, by introducing an interaction
between this variable and a dummy equal to 1 for a group of low corruption
countries.33 The result supports the hypothesis of a lower marginal effect for
more corrupt countries (1.7% against 2.3% for less corrupt ones). Column 3
presents a similar specification, where the corruption variable is replaced by
the bureaucratic quality index. Results are similar overall (the significance
of political risk and corruption actually improves), with a significant and
negative bureaucratic effect of around 1% for the group of countries with
better institutions.34 Note that in all cases, the marginal effect of corruption
is smaller than that of political risk.
Fixed effect estimations in columns 4 and 5 confirm the robustness of the
political corruption effect, with similar marginal effects. The direct effect
of corruption, however, loses statistical significance, as country fixed effects
seem to capture part of this effect, thus resting significance to the corruption
and bureaucratic variables.
32I obtain similar results when replacing the index of contract repudiation by an average
of this index with an index of the risk of investment expropriation.
33Different cutoff levels were tested and the one used in Table 2 (corruption index strictly
less than 3.33 on the PRS scale) proved the most significant. Around 25% of the countries
in the sample are below this threshold.
34Those with a value of the index less than 3.33, which includes around 40% of the
sample.
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Note that risk and corruption have important explanatory power, as their
inclusion augments the part of the variance explained by the regression (the
R2) by around 15%. Moreover, about half of this effect appears to be con-
ditional on the presence of the soil resources variable, while the soil variable
alone fails to rise the explanatory power of the estimations. An intuitive ex-
planation is that this variable captures the effect of natural resources projects
(oil, mining), which generally call for direct involvement from multinational
firms due to the size of the fixed investment required and political strategic
considerations, and are particularly prone to the kind of risk discussed in this
paper.
Standard controls, openness, size and level of development, as well as
inflation, are not significant in columns 1 to 3, but become significant when
allowing for country fixed effects. Richer countries receive a higher share of
FDI, while the effect of more openness and bigger size are negative. Higher
inflation, implying less macroeconomic stability, implies a higher relative
share of FDI. As for invariant characteristics, latitude is significant in regres-
sions 1 to 3, with countries nearer the equator receiving a higher share of
FDI. Time dummies for the periods 1985-89 and 1990-94 are negative and
very significant, probably indicating the recent shift towards a more favorable
perception of inward FDI flows.
One potential limitation of this empirical test is that the link between
the ratio of FDI to total capital flows and institutional quality variables
may be due to the movement of short term capital flows, included in the
left hand side variable’s denominator, that may be quickly reversed in a
scenario of increased institutional uncertainty.35 To test this hypothesis,
Table 3 presents estimations with the ratio of FDI to private capital flows
now excluding portfolio investment flows as dependent variable.
(Table 3 here)
Overall, the results again strongly support the political corruption story,
while the direct effect of corruption is of the expected sign but only weakly
significant. A one point increase in the risk index appears to have an average
positive impact of between 3.7 and 5.4% on the share of direct investment,
while the effect of corruption through its interaction with risk is again about
one sixth of the direct effect.
This preliminary evidence, based on aggregate data, is therefore consis-
tent with the model’s predictions. It also qualifies previous empirical findings.
Indeed, Wei and Wu (2000) conclude that “corruption in a capital-importing
35I thank a referee for making this point and suggesting the robustness test below.
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country tends to tilt the composition of its capital inflows away from foreign
direct investment and towards foreign bank loans”.36 Smarzynska and Wei
(2000), using firm-level data for Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union,
also find that corruption makes firms prefer a mode of entry based on a claim
with less control rights (licensing).37 Our results refine these conclusions by
stressing that the impact of corruption matters mostly by modifying the ef-
fect of political risk on capital flows. One hypothesis is that the importance
given to the direct effect of corruption in previous studies may be due to the
lack of control for political risk.
5 Conclusion
I have modeled the boundaries of the multinational firm, i.e. the financial
structure of its involvement in a foreign country, by looking at a simple trade-
off between FDI (internal expansion) and debt (arm’s length expansion),
and analyzed the effects of institutional constraints in host countries, i.e.
problems of commitment and, especially, corruption.
The model starts by showing that capital flows are more likely to take the
form of FDI when the ability to commit of the recipient is low, because in the
case of default or expropriation the firm is able to recover a greater proportion
of its subsequent profit, for example by shifting back some of its production
to another location. It then introduces two different aspects of corruption
affecting foreign investment, namely bureaucratic and political corruption.
Bureaucratic corruption is shown to favor debt against FDI, with a dimin-
ishing marginal effect as corruption increases. As for political corruption, it
is effective through its interaction with the risk of repudiation variable and
its sign is the opposite of the political risk effect, i.e. it favors debt. These
predictions are broadly supported by cross-country panel empirical evidence.
These conclusions challenge to some extent previous results by showing
that the main effect of corruption on capital flows arises through its inter-
action with political risk and that its marginal impact is only second order.
Institutional quality matters in a complex way, but clearly political risk, in
the sense of potential expropriation and lack of contractual commitment,
remains the key factor affecting multinational firms’ mode of entry.
36This study relies on a different sample and data set, based on bilateral capital flows
data from 13 developed countries to 30 less developed one, thus obviating more developed
countries as recipient. Furthermore, debt flows are restricted to bank lending statistics.
37Related results are found, among others, in Albuquerque (2003), Hausmann and
Fernández-Arias (2000), Henisz (2000) and Wei (2000).
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APPENDIX 1
The extensive game with complete information is represented in figure 2
L chooses Y = (y1, G-y1)
F chooses p and X = (x1, G-x1)
(0,0)
1-p p
L chooses X or p.Y
X
(x1, G-x1)
Y
1-p p
(0,0) (y1, (G-y1))
Figure 2: Extensive game
• In Stage 1: Country L proposes a payoff y1 (implicitly a pair Y =
(y1, G− y1), where y1 ≤ G).
• In Stage 2: The Firm F replies by proposing a payoff x1 (implicitly
a pair X = (x1, G− x1), where x1 ≤ G), and a probability p ∈ [0, 1] . With
probability 1 − p the game ends and the outcome is the status quo. With
probability p it continues.
• In Stage 3: Country L chooses either X or the lottery p.Y (i.e. the
lottery giving Y with probability p and the status quo with probability 1−p).
Its choice is the outcome.
Analyzing the game backwards, in stage 2 the firm chooses p (under the
constraint p ≤ 1) and x1 so as to maximize its final payoff, which is given
by either pp(G− y1), if country L chooses p.Y , or p(G− x1) if the country’s
choice is X. Formally, the firm’s program is:
max
p,x1
[min (pp(G− y1), p(G− x1))] (13)
s.t. p ≤ 1.
Anticipating that in stage 3, country L chooses between X and p.Y by
picking the highest value between px1 and ppy1, it is straightforward to see
that the firm will set p and x1 such that px1 = ppy1. Indeed, there is no
point in choosing p and x1 such that px1 < ppy1, since in this case X will
not be chosen anyway. On the other hand, if px1 > ppy1, F can improve its
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payoff by reducing x1 until px1 = ppy1, still ensuring country L’s indifference
between X and p.Y . The firm’s program thus reduces to:
max
p,x1
[p(G− x1)] (14)
s.t. x1 = py1, p ≤ 1.
Substituting for x1, and leaving aside the constraint for the moment, this
becomes:
max
p
[p(G− py1)] (15)
which yields p = G
2y1
. Taking now into account the constraint, two cases
arise depending on the value of y1. Specifically, if y1 ≥ G2 , p =
G
2y1
(the
constraint is slack, which corresponds to the case where the firm punishes
the country for setting y1 too high, by picking a p lower than 1) and x1 = G2 ,
while if y1 < G2 , p = 1 (the constraint is now binding) and x1 = y1.
Anticipating this, country L will choose y1 in stage 1, such that its payoff
is maximal. It is straightforward to see that its optimal choice is also y1 = G2 ,
thus leading the firm to choose x1 = G2 and p = 1, so that the outcome of the
game is the Nash solution
¡
G
2
, G
2
¢
. Indeed, a value of y1 less than G2 would
clearly be suboptimal, since the firm would simply choose x1 = y1 and p = 1,
giving the country a lower payoff than for y1 = G2 . On the other hand, if the
country chooses y1 > G2 , the firm’s rule leads it to react choosing x1 =
G
2
and
p = G
2y1
, giving again the country a payoff lower than G
2
(i.e. G
2
4y1
).
I now turn to the extensive game with asymmetric information:
• Stage 1: Country L chooses a payoff y1 (at this stage a pair Y =
(y1, E(G)− y1), since it does not know the true value of G).
• Stage 2: The Firm, knowing its type, chooses a payoff x1 (implicitly
a pair X = (x1, GR − x1), where x1 ≤ GR, the realized value of G, and
p ∈ [0, 1] . With probability 1 − p the game ends and the outcome is the
status quo. With probability p it continues.
• Stage 3: Country L chooses either X or the lottery p.Y (where Y =
(y1, G
R − y1)). Its choice is the outcome.
As we see, the only difference with the complete information case is that
in stage 1, country L faces the problem of choosing y1 such that its expected
payoff conditional on the realization of the firm’s type is maximum. Using
the same approach as before concerning the firm’s best response to any value
of y1, we see immediately the following.
If y1 = GW2 :
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A bad type (GW ) chooses x1 = y1 = GW2 , p = 1, so the outcome is the
same as in the complete information case.
A good type (GS) chooses x1 = y1 = GW2 , p = 1,(as in the complete
information setting when y1 < G2 ).
The total expected payoff for country L is νGW
2
+ (1− ν)GW
2
= GW
2
.
If y1 = GS2 :
A good type (GS) chooses x1 = y1 = GS2 , p = 1, so the outcome is the
same as in the complete information case.
A bad type (GW ) chooses x1 = GW2 , p =
GW
GS
, (as in the complete infor-
mation setting when y1 > G2 ).
The total expected payoff for country L is now νGS
2
+ (1− ν)G
2
W
2GS
.
Let us now consider the case GW
2
< y1 <
GS
2
(it is easily shown that
y1 <
GW
2
and y1 > GS2 are dominated by y1 =
GW
2
and y1 = GS2 respectively).
A good type (GS) chooses x1 = y1, p = 1, (again, as in the complete
information setting when y1 < G2 ).
A bad type (GW ) chooses x1 = GW2 , p =
GW
2y1
, (as in the complete infor-
mation setting when y1 > G2 ).
The expected payoff for country L is νy1 + (1 − ν)G
2
W
4y1
. This payoff is a
convex function of y1, so that the value that maximizes country L’s expected
payoff is either y1 = GW2 or y1 =
GS
2
depending on the values of ν, GW and
GS. Simple computations show that there is a threshold value ν∗ = GWGS+GW .
For ν < ν∗, y1 = GW2 , while for ν ≥ ν∗, y1 =
GS
2
, yielding the outcome
described in the text.
APPENDIX 2
Figure A1 presents the information structure with supervision.
G
ν
1- ν
GS
GW
ξ
1- ξ
σ = GS
σ = Ø
σ = Ø
Figure A1
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To see the effect of asymmetric information, we have to use the decom-
position of the project’s payoff into its two period components:
GS = G1 +G2,S
GW = G1 +G2,W .
When ν ≤ GW
GS+GW
, the firm’s payoffs from engaging in debt and FDI be-
come (the subscripts CI and AI denote complete information and asymmetric
information respectively):
UFS,DEBT,CI =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1− γ)G2,S
UFS,DEBT,AI =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1− γ)(G2,S +∆G2) (16)
UFW,DEBT =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1− γ)G2,W ,
and
UFS,FDI,CI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
(1− γ)G2,S + γθΠF2,S
UFS,FDI,AI =
1
2
((G1 −K) +
1
2
(1− γ)(G2,S +∆G2) + γθΠF2,W (17)
UFW,FDI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
(1− γ)G2,W + γθΠF2,W .
Note that in UFS,FDI,AI the last term γθΠF2,W reflects the fact that the good
type investor is taking advantage of the asymmetry of information to mimic
the bad type and have a better status quo position in the renegotiation. The
three payoffs above are received by the firm with respective probabilities νξ,
ν(1− ξ), and 1− ν. Simple computations yield the trade-off:
FDI Â Debt⇔ γ ¡νξθΠF2,S + (1− νξ)θΠF2,W¢− K2 > 0. (18)
When ν > GW
GS+GW
, the payoffs are:
UFS,DEBT,CI =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1− γ)G2,S
UFS,DEBT,AI =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1− γ)G2,S (19)
UFW,DEBT =
1
2
G1 +
1
2
(1− γ)
G22,W
G2,S
,
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and
UFS,FDI,CI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
(1− γ)G2,S + γθΠF2,S
UFS,FDI,AI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
(1− γ)G2,S + γθΠF2,S (20)
UFW,FDI =
1
2
(G1 −K) +
1
2
(1− γ)
G22,W
G2,S
+ γθΠF2,W .
Note that now the firm has revealed its type in period 1 by choosing
between x1 = y1 = GS2 , p = 1, and x1 =
GW
2
, p = GW
GS
, so a good type has
no scope for pretending being a bad type in the second period renegotiation.
Similar computations as before show that in this case the trade-off is the
same as under complete information.
Consider finally an information structure where the politician also re-
ceives information on the bad type project. The revelation of this piece of
information allows the implementation of the complete information solution,
so the efficiency loss is avoided. The politician might then threaten the firm
not to reveal its information in exchange for a share of the potential gain
(“give me α(GW
2
− G
2
2,W
G2,S
) or I don’t reveal you are GW .”) For the same reason
as before, the FDI vs. debt trade-off is not altered by this potential extortion.
APPENDIX 3
Countries in the sample: Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Australia, Austria,
Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belgium, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bul-
garia, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany, Ghana,
Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland,
India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kenya,
Korea, Kuwait, Libya, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, Malta, Mexico, Mongo-
lia, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Namibia, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Peru,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian, Saudi Arabia, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka,
Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo,
Trinidad, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay,
Venezuela, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe.
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Table 2. Dependent variable: Ln (FDI / Total capital flows) 
 
Sample Panel 1985-99 Panel 1985-99 Panel 1985-99 Panel 1985-99 Panel 1985-99 
 
Estimation method 
No intercept. 
Time and 
regional 
dummies. 
No intercept. 
Time and 
regional 
dummies. 
No intercept. 
Time and 
regional 
dummies. 
 
Fixed effects. 
Time 
dummies. 
 
Fixed effects. 
Time 
dummies. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln GDP per capita -0.002 
(0.014) 
-0.006 
(0.015) 
0.003 
(0.014) 
0.161*** 
(0.051) 
0.158*** 
(0.046) 
Ln Imports/GDP 0.129 
(0.256) 
0.086 
(0.247) 
0.070 
(0.259) 
-1.213** 
(0.526) 
-1.280** 
(0.534) 
Ln GDP -0.018 
(0.068) 
0.014 
(0.072) 
-0.051 
(0.060) 
-0.922* 
(0.479) 
-1.018** 
(0.450) 
Soil ressources 0.149** 
(0.070) 
0.151** 
(0.070) 
0.143* 
(0.083) 
  
Latitude -1.752** 
(0.727) 
-2.025*** 
(0.764) 
-1.531** 
(0.723) 
  
Inflation -0.346 
(1.287) 
0.166 
(1.230) 
-0.494 
(1.300) 
2.546** 
(1.260) 
2.543** 
(1.273) 
Risk of contract 
repudiation 
0.297* 
(0.159) 
0.311** 
(0.156) 
0.391*** 
(0.143) 
0.432*** 
(0.150) 
0.312** 
(0.149) 
Corruption -0.143* 
(0.083) 
-0.166* 
(0.085) 
 0.107 
(0.092) 
 
Corruption * dummy 
low corruption 
 -0.230* 
(0.121) 
 -0.058 
(0.083) 
 
Bureaucratic quality   0.016 
(0.049) 
 -0.104 
(0.109) 
Bureaucratic quality * 
dummy low bur. qual 
  -0.103* 
(0.054) 
 -0.009 
(0.095) 
Risk * Corruption -0.051* 
(0.029) 
-0.054* 
(0.029) 
-0.080*** 
(0.023) 
-0.073*** 
(0.023) 
-0.047** 
(0.021) 
N 136 136 136 201 201 
R2 0.37 0.39 0.37 0.71 0.70 
White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
Results significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
Regional dummies included: Latin America and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa, Most Developed Countries (Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand). 
Estimates for time and regional dummies are not reported.
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Table 3. Dependent variable: Ln (FDI / Total capital flows excluding portfolio 
investment flows) 
 
Sample Panel 1985-99 Panel 1985-99 Panel 1985-99 Panel 1985-99 Panel 1985-99 
 
Estimation method 
No intercept. 
Time and 
regional 
dummies. 
No intercept. 
Time and 
regional 
dummies. 
No intercept. 
Time and 
regional 
dummies. 
 
Fixed effects. 
Time 
dummies. 
 
Fixed effects. 
Time 
dummies. 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Ln GDP per capita 0.013 
(0.018) 
0.008 
(0.020) 
0.017 
(0.018) 
0.177*** 
(0.047) 
0.160*** 
(0.042) 
Ln Imports/GDP -0.025 
(0.329) 
-0.038 
(0.319) 
-0.079 
(0.337) 
-1.559*** 
(0.515) 
-1.665*** 
(0.523) 
Ln GDP 0.012 
(0.070) 
0.040 
(0.076) 
-0.013 
(0.065) 
-1.102** 
(0.491) 
-1.144** 
(0.482) 
Soil ressources 0.103 
(0.087) 
0.108 
(0.087) 
0.100 
(0.095) 
  
Latitude -1.454* 
(0.823) 
-1.712** 
(0.820) 
-1.308 
(0.807) 
  
Inflation -1.488 
(1.701) 
-1.114 
(1.606) 
-1.566 
(1.683) 
0.997 
(1.494) 
0.932 
(1.512) 
Risk of contract 
repudiation 
0.379** 
(0.166) 
0.386** 
(0.165) 
0.431*** 
(0.152) 
0.544*** 
(0.155) 
0.365** 
(0.157) 
Corruption -0.077 
(0.078) 
-0.098 
(0.081) 
 0.186* 
(0.101) 
 
Corruption * dummy 
low corruption 
 -0.192 
(0.132) 
 0.024 
(0.107) 
 
Bureaucratic quality   0.028 
(0.059) 
 -0.171* 
(0.101) 
Bureaucratic quality * 
dummy low bur. qual 
  -0.064 
(0.058) 
 -0.040 
(0.098) 
Risk * Corruption -0.068** 
(0.030) 
-0.069** 
(0.030) 
-0.086*** 
(0.025) 
-0.090*** 
(0.023) 
-0.050** 
(0.020) 
N 131 131 131 196 196 
R2 0.36 0.37 0.37 0.74 0.74 
White Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors in parentheses.  
Results significant at the 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*). 
Regional dummies included: Latin America and Caribbean, Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Middle East and 
North Africa, Most Developed Countries (Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand). 
Estimates for time and regional dummies are not reported.
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